Murcia or how the PSOE can be after May

It is to be feared and expected that the right will react as it always does: late and crying. And it is to be hoped and feared that if the PSOE loses most of its territorial power in municipalities and autonomies in May, it will begin to behave the way it has done in Murcia, where it has long lost hope to contest power for the PP. There, according to the polls, Valcárcel could double the Socialists in seats, an electoral palliation that the left answers by means of a physical palette to a counsellor who is particularly hated by socialists and trade unionists, an unhappy couple who-even if the now-working Arenas does not want to know-will form, as in Aznar's last two years, the usual violent picket that will do anything, wherever and in any way to drive the PP out of power.

Unfortunately, political paralysis and physical cowardice have always led to the triumph of the violent left. Neither the coup of the 34th nor the revolutionary process of the 36th would have occurred if the right, after winning the elections, had believed in itself and defended its voters and, by the way, the law in force. But the apocalypse, the maricomplejinismo of the political right, is not today but a century ago. Christian Democrat Alcalá Zamora, President of the Second Republic, did everything he could-and was not little-to prevent the coherent and uncontemplating political alternative to Republicans and socialists. Lerroux, happily civilized, had lost his fiery "young barbarian" and Gil Robles, with the greatest electoral power of the right, never knew what to do with the veto of his legitimate access to power or against the rebellion in the street of those who had lost at the polls. Neither the CEDA, nor even authoritarian monarchists like Calvo Sotelo were able to prepare a mechanism to defend their people and, by the way, legality, despite the fact that since the end of'33, the "bolshevization" of the PSOE, which Besteiro had courageously faced, led fatally to the Civil War. If the Socialists were not stopped earlier.

But nobody stopped them. In July of'36 the political right came to the fore of what a small fascist group such as the Falange and a tiny movement of the 19th century as the Carlists did to counter revolutionary violence through reactionary violence. Large and small parties were entrusted to those who could hardly mobilize for counter-revolutionary politics, which were the military. And the Church, which resisted, but only symbolically, those who since 1931, and especially since 1934, had identified it as the ideological enemy no longer to conquer but to exterminate. It is almost miraculous that Franco won the war, even thanks to the heroic effort of the sociological bases of the right. But unfortunately the military triumph-and Catholic clerical-prevented during the second half of Francoism a modern political vertebration and an ideological update of the broad social majority that supported the regime. The Transition, which was a way of burying the dictatorship from within and without the anti-Francoists being able to assault the Valley of the fallen-now, yes-also came out of a miracle. And much of the defects of the constitutional system of 1978 are based on a lack of political culture, moral criteria and intellectual formation.

"How to thrive in uncertain times... "This is a fantastic opportunity for self-care, reflection and solitude...… https://t.co/4NRiWy9RIX

— Fernando G Aguinaco Mon Mar 16 04:38:02 +0000 2020

In fact, until Aznar's arrival at the head of the PP in 1990, no one, except small groups of intellectuals and journalists, among whom stands out the one who eventually created the Digital Freedom group, worried about forging an ideological alternative to the PSOE, whose university and media dominance was overwhelming. The social right could only be grouped around two political values: the nation and freedom; that is, the idea of Spain that unites all the right, and the liberal principles, which are the only ones capable of awakening in their traditional mode to the youngest and most dynamic part of this average Spain. However, the cursed right complex, which always manifests itself in the invocation of centrism, from Alcalá Zamora to Rajoy, from Suárez to Aznar, has outlawed from professional politics the ideas that most like its

So long an excurso takes us back to the UVI of a hospital in Murcia, where a prominent PP leader penalizes his ideological choice and his practical defencelessness. My impression, not for now but for a long time, is that the left is violent with the right because it feels legitimized for it; and the right does not defend itself from such violence because, in essence, it assumes its delegitimization on the part of the left, whether media or thugs. The decomposition of the PP in terms of ideas and values has been so rapid in recent years that I find it unlikely, even possible, to think about this atavic suicidal propensity to accept its institutional, political, ideological and even physical defencelessness. We already know what the Power is capable of doing the PSOE. The first thing to do is to discuss how to prevent a PSOE allied with the rest of the left and the nationalists from ending up in the street, violently, in the way of their Murcia comrades, with a right-wing government, alone or associated with the national left. If the legitimacy of the PP depends on the left, which is the Gallardón formula, it is lost. If the right does not believe in itself, it cannot defend itself. And no one believes less in that substantial part of Spain than the professional politicians who represent it.